

Introduction to Cryptography: Homework 3

Submit by January 21, 2013.

Note: If you cannot solve an item which is part of a question, you can still solve other items in this question assuming that the first holds.

1. Let $n=pq$. Define $\lambda(n)=\text{lcm}(p-1,q-1)$, i.e., $\lambda(n)$ is the least common multiple of $p-1$ and $q-1$. (If $p=11,q=19$, then $\lambda(n)=90$.)
 - a. Show that if $a=1 \pmod{\lambda(n)}$ then for all $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ it holds that $m^a = m \pmod{n}$. (Hint: use the CRT.)
 - b. Show that in the RSA cryptosystem one can choose e,d to satisfy $ed=1 \pmod{\lambda(n)}$. (Instead of satisfying $ed=1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$.)

2. Consider the following public-key encryption scheme. The public key is (G,q,g,h) and the private key is $x=\log_g h$, generated exactly as in the El Gamal scheme. (g is a generator of a subgroup of order q of G .) In order to encrypt a bit b the sender does the following:
 - a. If $b=0$ it chooses a random $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computes $C_1=g^y$ and $C_2=h^y$. The ciphertext is (C_1,C_2) .
 - b. If $b=1$ it chooses independent random $y,z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computes $C_1=g^y$ and $C_2=g^z$. The ciphertext is (C_1,C_2) .

Show that it is possible to decrypt efficiently given knowledge of the private key x .

Prove, by showing a reduction, that if the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption is hard in the subgroup generated by g , then this encryption scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attacks. Include in your answer an analysis of the error probability of the algorithm which is described in the reduction.